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Abstract. Wireless Mesh Networks are an increasingly common tech-
nology providing connectivity in many communities, particularly where
Internet access is unavailable or restricted via more conventional means.
Their comparative ease of installation and relatively low cost makes this
especially true for communities which might previously have lacked the
technical knowledge or skill to attempt such an endeavour. In such a
situation it is important that the operation of the network should be
easily manageable; to this end the overall resiliency of the network is a
key factor, enabling the network to resolve and remediate problems as
they arise without requiring external technical understanding or input.
This research aims to improve the resilience of community mesh networks
by improving their security, initially examining the use of risk analysis
techniques in this environment to identify potential attack vectors. This
understanding will then be used to investigate intrusion detection tech-
niques for operation specifically in a community environment.
1 Introduction
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are becoming increasingly common, particu-
larly to provide network connectivity to communities where wired deployment
strategies are either not possible or are prohibitively expensive. The proliferation
of ‘off the shelf’ mesh hardware and software [1, 2] has resulted in communi-
ties creating wireless mesh networking installations themselves where previously
they might not have possessed the understanding or technical skill. These fac-
tors combined with the many potential issues which might occur throughout the
operation of a wireless mesh have led to a requirement for increased resiliency,
enabling the network to resolve and remediate against problems as and when
they arise without the need for external technical understanding or input.
Resilience in this context can be thought of as the aim to provide an accept-
able level of service when challenges to network operation occur, whatever the
adverse event or condition might be [3]. A resilience strategy to address potential
problems has been developed as part of the EU FP6 ANA Project – D2R2+DR.
This consists of two ongoing phases, firstly (D2R2) Defence against potential
challenges and Detection of their presence as and when they occur, Remediation
of the effects and eventual Recovery of the system back to normal operation.
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Secondly, (DR) consists of Diagnosis and Refinement of the system based on the
results of previous first phase iterations.
WMNs are intended to be resilient by design. Their infrastructure is cre-
ated using a combination of wireless networking technology and ad-hoc routing
protocols to create a self-managing network in which all nodes act as routers
[5], able to route traffic either directly or via a multi-hop path. Unfortunately,
whilst WMNs are considered to be functional the technology and protocols be-
hind these mechanisms are still relatively new and research is ongoing to improve
their dependability and efficiency [4]. Security is a necessary facet of resiliency
in wireless mesh networking; resilient routing protocols and autonomous config-
uration can only go so far if these processes can be abused by attackers. Due to
this security has been chosen as the main focus of this research.
2 The Research Problem
The specific scenario being investigated is that of community wireless mesh net-
working – situations where mesh networking technology has been introduced
into a community environment, rather than through any commercial applica-
tion, and where it is operated by the users themselves. An example of this is
the situation at Wray, a small rural village in the North West of England. In
2003, members of the community approached academics at Lancaster University
searching for a solution to their lack of broadband Internet access. The result
was the deployment of a WMN throughout the village with nodes owned and
hosted by individual members of the community, making available an Internet
connection fed into the local school via a 5.8Ghz radio link [6]. In this situation,
though the University has access to use the network for research purposes, the
villagers themselves oversee and operate the network on a daily basis and users
with a range of expertise and computer literacy have responsibility and control
over how the network runs. The resilience of the network is incredibly important.
In many cases the users rely on the network as their sole method of access to
the Internet, but they lack the technical experience and knowledge of computer
networking to manually fix problems if they arise.
For generic network security there are goals which applications aim to achieve:
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorisation and account-
ability - in a WMN there are specific challenges to these goals over and above
those found in more conventional wired networks. The shared wireless medium
exists such that any one with suitable wireless hardware has the ability to listen
to traffic on the network, launch jamming attacks to deny network functionality,
or even to send out malicious control traffic to other routing nodes [7]. Also, a lack
of physical protection for the mesh nodes themselves could result in legitimate
mesh infrastructure becoming compromised; this is emphasised by the nature of
ubiquitous access within a community mesh, all members of the community are
offered network access, but with no specific assurance that attackers won’t come
from within the community group, potentially hosting the infrastructure they
have compromised. In a community WMN scenario, attack vectors can occur
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externally and internally to the network infrastructure and this results in an
extremely wide scope of potential attacks to combat. Another factor alongside
this is the diversity of needs, requirements and backgrounds within the com-
munity. A single community group may contain home users, small businesses,
people making use of the network for educational purposes and so on, all with
different understandings of what the network provides and what functionality is
most important to them. Also each of these users may have particular security
requirements, for stored data or important communications.
Without a clear idea of these requirements, the security needs for the network
are both vague and wide in scope. This makes the development of a security
strategy for use in this scenario incredibly difficult. An understanding of the uses,
priorities, and necessary services would substantially aid the creation of security
systems, procedures, and policies by narrowing the problem space involved.
3 Chosen Approach
In order to gain an insight into the utilisation of the network and the require-
ments of individual users, we need to understand from the perspective of the
users themselves what they consider to be their most important assets and what
they feel are most vulnerable to attack. The concept of risk analysis within com-
puter networking is not new; there are many tried and tested frameworks for the
assessment of such factors, particularly within enterprise scale networks used
for businesses or academia. Examples include the OCTAVE risk based strategic
assessment process [8], or STRIDE, a practice for computer security threat mod-
elling [9]. Unfortunately due to the distinct operational nature and requirements
of community mesh networks, such proven formalised methods are not directly
applicable. Other work in the area of mesh network resilience has often focussed
on specific perceived threats, from low level protocol improvements to hardware
solutions for increased link availability; little work has been carried out which
takes the opinions and concerns of the mesh users into account when identifying
threats to resilience. This research intends to apply risk analysis techniques in a
community wireless mesh network setting, with the aim identifying the most im-
portant risks for the users from their own perspective, what assets exist and are
most appealing to an attacker, and the weighted probability of the occurrence
of types of attack aimed at specific assets.
This approach has been chosen firstly because of the benefits of being able
to narrow down the attack vectors present in a WMN, but secondly to investi-
gate whether risk analysis techniques can be formalised for use in similar situa-
tions. Such a formalised process would enable community users of mesh networks
to perform risk analysis themselves, looking for ways to improve their security
without involving external consultants. The process of consulting members of
the community about their own security concerns also fits well with the way
that community WMNs operate – everyone having a hand in their continued
functionality and contributing to the project as a whole.
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Before involving network users in the project, certain decisions must be made
regarding the suitability of particular risk analysis techniques and assumptions
within this community scenario. For example, the concept of an ‘asset’ is likely
to be different when compared with an enterprise setting – users may consider
the safety of their children on the Internet of the utmost importance, whereas
within a company employees would be expected to in many respects look after
themselves. The community risk analysis will be carried out through small focus
groups and discussion sessions with real world users, using carefully selected
scenarios and lines of questioning to help explain the project. The research is in
its preliminary stages and over the course of the next year sessions are planned
with members of the community at Wray.
4 Conclusion
Resiliency in WMNs is a complex area and security is a critical factor. This
research aims to improve the resilience of WMNs by examining improvements in
the area of security. Firstly by reducing the problem space involved, then leading
to the development of a security strategy with relevant and appropriate security
systems for use in community WMNs. In order to reduce the problem space, a
breakdown of assets and risks from the perspective of community WMN users
will be produced; the process of creating which should indicate the feasibility
of formalising this risk analysis procedure for users themselves to carry out
as a community project. This information will be used to narrow down the
number of attack vectors necessary to anticipate, prevent and detect in the
target development of an IDS to demonstrate the functionality in a community
WMN environment.
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